Unlicensed Gold Mining, Trade Leave Northern Ghana Exposed To JNIM Terrorists — Report

Ghana’s northern gold-mining belt faces growing exposure to extremist operations, new research has shown.

The study, published by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, a Geneva-based non-profit organisation, showed that the informal nature of artisanal and small-scale gold mining, porous borders with Burkina Faso, and opaque financial flows create conditions that could be exploited by Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the Sahel’s most powerful extremist group.

The study is titled “Violent extremist threats to northern Ghana’s gold sector,” and was published on 3 December.

According to the study, gold mining in Ghana has been largely informal. Unlicensed gold mining is prevalent across northern Ghana, particularly in Wa and Tumu in the country’s Upper West region.

In these areas, new mining sites are quickly established based on informal tips about gold-bearing locations, with operations remaining highly mobile and relying on a trial-and-error approach.

As one of Africa’s leading gold producers, Ghana’s mining industry is central to its economy and takes two main forms: industrial mining and artisanal mining.

Primarily, large-scale operations are run by multinational firms in regions such as Ashanti, Western, and Ahafo. In these cases, the mines are formally regulated and account for most official gold exports.

The report noted that unlicensed mining is widespread, with a substantial share of gold production diverted from official channels and sold to traders from neighbouring countries.

Despite government efforts to tighten control on the sector, cross-border smuggling continues to thrive. This is caused by weak enforcement in remote areas, porous borders, and the financial influence of foreign traders offering better prices and prefinancing to miners.

The study showed that about 60 to 70 per cent of the gold mined in northern Ghana is bought by Burkinabe dealers and smuggled across the border, where it enters wider trading networks.

Why JNIM seeks Ghana’s gold
The new study showed that the JNIM is increasingly considering northern Ghana as a zone for resource generation.

The terrorists seek to use the cheap gold sourced from this region to sponsor their operations in the broader part of the Sahel.

JNIM operates across the Sahel, mainly in Mali and Burkina Faso, and is gradually pushing into nearby border areas.

According to the report, the group raises money locally. In communities where it has control, it taxes villagers, uses smuggling routes, and exploits informal activities such as gold mining and livestock trading.

Gold is essential to JNIM because it is easy to move and sell.

Although Ghana has not suffered direct attacks, the report noted that the Upper West region has already become a logistics corridor for fuel, motorbikes, explosives, and fertiliser used in improvised devices.

Security agencies have also recorded instances of militants crossing into Ghanaian territory and cases where local traders unwittingly engaged in commerce with JNIM-linked networks.

The report revealed that Ghanaian citizens are engaged in trade with JNIM, sometimes knowingly and at other times unknowingly. They are also sometimes recruited or used as couriers, driven by factors such as limited resources and unemployment.

“JNIM’s senior media commander has indicated that Fulani people from Ghana are present in Burkina Faso under JNIM’s influence, where they provide logistical support but are not directly involved in military actions against Ghana.

“A member of the Burkinabe Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie – VDP) said that border security sweeps,” a part of the report read.

How JNIM penetrates the Ghana gold market
JNIM is able to penetrate the Ghanaian local market because of the higher prices it offers to unlicensed artisanal miners.

Also, the report identified that traders prioritise volume and seek smaller profit margins, making them more attractive to miners in Ghana.

The report also noted that in several cases, Burkinabe buyers provide prefinancing to miners to secure gold production in advance while fixing prices at a lower rate.

The marginalisation of Fulani communities, most of whom live in border areas, also worsened the situation.

The report noted that many Fulani are engaged in pastoralism, informal trade, or small-scale mining and often live in border areas with limited state presence.

They also face persistent discrimination, frequent harassment by security agencies, and difficulties accessing national identity documents.

Taking advantage of this, the terrorist group presents itself as a protector against abuse or injustice, especially where the state is weak or absent.

JNIM also recruits from marginalised Fulani youth, particularly those affected by poverty, displacement, or violence.

The recruits do not work as fighters, but rather as guides, couriers, informants, or suppliers, relying on their cross-border mobility and knowledge.

To address this, the study recommended that the state government actively engage Fulani leaders and communities, reduce harassment, facilitate access to national identity cards, and address farmer–herder conflicts through mediation and dialogue.

It also suggested simplifying licensing processes and extending them to northern regions, and that border controls should focus on disrupting smuggling networks rather than profiling communities. Also, monitoring gold prefinancing and cash movements should be prioritised.

It added that, “Ghana, regional bodies, bilateral partners, and development agencies should invest in research to monitor and analyse JNIM’s strategies for infiltrating extractive industries. Given the threat and the dynamic nature of both the sector and JNIM’s activities, ongoing monitoring is crucial.

“Improved understanding of the group’s operational shifts can inform adaptive responses across West Africa’s gold-producing regions,” it stated.

Source: PREMIUM TIMES